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The emergence of competition is a defining aspect of human nature and characterizes many 
important social environments. However, its relationship with how social groups are formed 
has received little attention. We design an experiment to analyze how individuals’ 
willingness to compete is affected by group identity. We find that individuals display 
substantially stronger competitiveness in within group (ingroup) matchings than in between 
group (outgroup) matchings or in a control setting where no group identity is induced. We 
also find that the effect of group identity is stronger for subjects who participated more 
actively in the team-building task. 
Keywords: competition; social distance; group identity; laboratory experiment. 
JEL: C92, D03. 
Acknowledgments: We thank Steffen Altmann, Gary Charness, Nick Vriend and Philipp Zahn 
for useful comments and Graeme Pearce for programming assistance. Financial support from 
the Queen Mary University of London is gratefully acknowledged.  
* School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London. Email address: f.cornaglia@qmul.ac.uk 
** Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. Email address: m.drouvelis@bham.ac.uk  
*** CESifo, Munich, Germany. 




                                                          
1. Introduction 
Competitiveness is a pervasive trait of human nature and arguably one of the most important 
factors influencing social environments. An emerging body of experimental literature 
(following Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) shows that an individual’s propensity to compete 
depends on various factors. Over the past decade, numerous lab and field studies have 
discussed the role of demographic factors (most prominently, gender – a large literature 
indicates that women are less willing to compete than men) as well as socio-economic factors 
and environmental factors (mostly cultural factors that may also be determined by particular 
geographic characteristics of the location of residence – see Leibbrandt et al. (2013)). More 
recently, it has also been shown that the effect of individual traits may be mediated by 
cultural/environmental factors. Indeed Gneezy et al. (2009) provide evidence that the 
direction of gender gaps in the willingness to compete crucially depends on local culture. 
While in patriarchal societies a lower willingness to compete among women is observed, this 
is not the case in matrilineal societies.  
In this paper, we discuss the impact of another crucial environmental factor on 
willingness to compete: the existence of group divisions within a community. Societies are 
often organized into multiple groups (such as religious, ethnic and political groups) that, as 
documented by the literature, are often the basis for ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
discrimination (see Hewstone et al., 2002, for a recent review). We design an experiment that 
manipulates the saliency of group membership and investigates whether and how social 
distance among subjects influences their propensity to compete.  
Most of the extant literature on group identity analyses its impact on prosocial 
behavior (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009; Bernhard et al., 2006; Falk and Zehnder, 2007). In our 
study, we deviate from this literature by focusing on the effects of group identity on another 
major aspect of economics decision-making: individuals’ willingness to compete. Group 
membership might affect the propensity to compete (namely, choice of the remuneration 
scheme) through “interpersonal comparison” channels, for instance, by affecting the 
perceived social image/social status of an individual within a group. Competition choices 
might be affected by group salience if the taste for competition is directly linked to the group 
membership of the competitors. A priori, it is an open empirical question whether social 
distance affects tastes for competition positively or negatively. On the one hand, a 
competitive choice of an individual against a member of her own group might represent a 
boost in her perceived status within her own group. In this case, we would expect a negative 
relationship between social distance and taste for competition, implying that competition is 
higher in within group (ingroup) matchings than in between group (outgroup) matchings. On 
the other hand, a competitive choice of an individual against a member of a different group 
might push the perceived status of the entire group. In this case, we would expect a positive 
relationship between social distance and taste for competition, implying competition is lower 
in within group (ingroup) matchings than in between group (outgroup) matchings. 
In a competitive environment, however, individual actions might carry negative 
externalities on other individuals. Altruistic considerations might then affect competition 
choices and, as a result, group membership is likely to play a role, for instance, by boosting 
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altruism towards in-group members and decreasing altruism towards outgroup members (see 
Chen and Li, 2009). As in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) we shut down this potential 
channel by making sure the individual decision to compete does not carry externalities on 
others and thus our focus is on how group identity interacts with the “interpersonal 
comparison” channels mentioned above. 
To test whether group identity influences the willingness to compete and to 
understand the relationship between social distance and taste for competition, we employ 
common techniques from social psychology, such as the minimal group paradigm, as a means 
of manipulating the structure of social groups. In particular, we create artificial groups in the 
lab, which allow us to achieve the highest degree of control over the formation of social 
groups, thus facilitating the identification of the causal effect of social distance on 
competition. Following the group identity manipulation, we measure the willingness to 
compete by asking participants to indicate how they would like to get paid by selecting either 
a non-competitive (piece rate) or a competitive (winner-take-all tournament) incentive 
scheme after they have obtained relevant experience pertaining to each scheme. As a result, 
we are able to compare the competitive choices of subjects under three different conditions: 
(i) a setting without group identity where subjects choose between a piece rate scheme or a 
tournament to be played against another subject; (ii) a setting with group identity where 
subjects choose between a piece rate scheme or a tournament to be played against a member 
of their own group (ingroup); (iii) a setting with group identity where subjects choose 
between a piece rate scheme or a tournament to be played against a member of a different 
group (outgroup). 
Our results are striking. We find that group identity matters: subjects are more likely 
to make competitive choices when group identity is artificially introduced. Interestingly, we 
find that the willingness to compete is higher when social distance among subjects is low: 
subjects are between 67% and 80% more likely to choose the tournament option when they 
compete against a member of their own group (controlling for factors that are likely to affect 
competition choices) compared to the setting without group identity. This is not attributed to 
differences in performance. We also determine that the observed effect is stronger on subjects 
who participate more in the team-building activity (and therefore who may be more likely to 
be concerned about their status within the group). 
We broaden the existing literature in various respects. First, we contribute to the 
literature examining the determinants of the willingness to compete. A variety of studies have 
shown substantial gender differences in their willingness to compete (e.g., Apicella & Dreber, 
2015; Buser et al., 2012; Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Dargnies, 2012; Dreber et al., 2014; 
Flory et al., 2014; Gneezy et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy & Pietrasz, 2013; Gneezy 
& Rustichini, 2004; Healy & Pate, 2011; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007, 2010, 2011; Price, 
2008; Sutter & Rützler, 2015; Wozniak et al., 2014). These differences also seem to depend 
on age (e.g., Charness and Villeval, 2009) and the family background (e.g., Almas et al., 
2016). Moreover, Leibbrandt et al., (2013) discuss how geographical characteristics (in 
particular, proximity either to a lake or the sea) might generate very different work 
environments, slowly instilling different types of cultures (e.g., more individualistic cultures 
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close to the lake because the lake's ecology leads fishermen to work and fish in isolation) and 
therefore generating very different preferences for competition. We contribute to the 
competition literature by exploring the relationship between group identity and individuals’ 
willingness to compete. 
We also add to the literature that focuses on the effects of group identity on individual 
behavior. An extensive literature in social psychology documents that group membership is 
likely to affect behavior (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In the economic literature, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) have highlighted that identification with social groups is an important 
dimension to consider when analyzing economic decisions that have consequences in social 
life. This has also been recognized by recent experimental economic evidence; in particular, 
numerous studies have shown that individuals tend to favor those who belong to their own 
social group and discriminate towards out-groups in various strategic contexts (e.g.,; 
Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011). We contribute to this 
literature by examining the impact of group membership on a crucial characteristic of human 
economic behavior: competitiveness. Our findings suggest that group membership might not 
only stimulate pro-social attitudes towards other members of the group as shown by a large 
literature but also amplify competitive behavior within the same group. 
More specifically, we contribute to the existing literature exploring the relationship 
between group identity and pro-social behavior. Results from this literature typically suggest 
that high-identity groups are more cooperative compared to those with weaker identities. This 
has been documented both in the laboratory (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Drouvelis and 
Nosenzo, 2013) as well as in the field (e.g., Solow and Kirkwood, 2002; Bernhard et al., 
2006; Falk and Zehnder, 2007).1 In contrast, competitiveness is considered to be an aspect of 
human behavior at the other end of the spectrum with respect to cooperative behavior (see the 
Social Value Orientation measure; e.g., Murphy et al., 2011). The negative relationship 
between co-operation and social distance documented by the literature does not however have 
to imply a positive relationship between competition choice and social distance, as we 
provide strong evidence that competition is higher in within group (ingroup) matchings than 
in between group (outgroup) matchings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental 
design and procedures. Section 3 presents our main findings. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental design 
To analyze the impact of social distance on competition choices, we design an experiment 
that consists of two parts. In Part 1, we manipulate group identity by asking subjects to 
perform a problem-solving task either in groups or individually (depending on the treatment). 
In Part 2, subjects participate in a four-stage experiment in which they are given the 
opportunity to make decisions about how they would like to get paid for their performance. 
We discuss the two parts of the experiment in turn. 
1 There is also related literature finding empirical evidence for the presence of parochial altruism (that is, the 
combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility) in experimental contest and conflict games (see 
Abbink et al., 2010, 2012). 
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Part 1. Group identity manipulation 
We manipulate group identity following the procedures used by Chen and Li (2009).2 
At the beginning of Part 1, subjects are shown five pairs of paintings made by two artists 
(Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky). For each pair, subjects had to choose which of the two 
paintings they preferred. Subjects were then ranked according to their own choices and 
assigned to either the “Kandinsky” group or the “Klee” group. After subjects had made their 
choices, they were informed of the group to which they belonged. Following their assignment 
to one of the two groups and in order to strengthen identities, subjects participated in a 
problem-solving team building task and were given five minutes to communicate with 
members of their own group via a computer chat program before submitting their answers.3 
We refer to the resulting treatment as the “Identity” treatment. For control purposes, we also 
conducted a treatment where no group identity was manipulated. In this treatment, subjects 
also participated in the problem-solving task, but they were not asked about their preferences 
regarding the paintings. As a result, subjects were not divided into groups and could not 
communicate with any other participant before submitting their answers. We refer to this 
treatment as the “No-Identity” treatment. 
Part 2. Competition choice 
After the group manipulation phase had finished, subjects proceeded to the next part 
of the experiment, which allows us to measure how social distance impacts competition 
choices. At the beginning of Part 2, subjects were randomly matched into pairs. Within the 
“Identity” treatment, we distinguish between i) the “ingroup” treatment, where subjects in a 
pair belongs to the same group (so either both subjects belong to the “Kandinsky” group or 
they both belong to the “Klee” group) and ii) the “outgroup” treatment, where subjects in a 
pair belong to different groups (one of two subjects belongs to the “Kandinsky” group and 
the other one belongs to the “Klee” group). For simplicity, we will refer to subjects in the 
“ingroup” and “outgroup” treatment as “ingroups” and “outgroups”, respectively. Subjects 
were then informed of whether their counterparts belonged to the same group or to a different 
group from Part 1. Within the “No-Identity” treatment, subjects were paired randomly with 
another participant and there was no reference to the “Kandinsky” and “Klee” groups from 
Part 1.  
Subjects then participated in four different tasks and the pairings remained the same 
throughout the experiment.  We used a similar design to the one introduced by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). In all four tasks, subjects had to perform an addition task. Specifically, 
subjects were asked to add four randomized two-digit numbers and to complete as many of 
these summations as possible in three minutes. Equations were presented to participants on a 
computer screen, where subjects typed in their answer and clicked a “Submit” button once 
2 These are inspired by the social psychology literature (for a review of methodologies, see Tajfel and Turner, 
1986). 
3 In the problem-solving task, subjects reviewed four paintings (two by Paul Klee and two by Wassily 
Kandinsky), and were asked to guess the artist who made each painting. Communication via the chat program 
was unrestricted, except that subjects were forbidden to reveal their identity and to use obscene language. 
Subjects submitted their answers individually and received £0.50 per correct guess. Subjects did not learn 
whether their guesses were correct until the end of the experiment.  
5 
 
                                                          
they were ready. After each submission, subjects were shown the next equation to solve. 
Subjects were provided with a sheet of paper and a pen, but no other form of help was 
available to them. The difference in the structure of the four tasks hinged on how subjects 
were getting paid in each task. Below, a description of each of the tasks is provided. 
Task 1 (Piece rate): Subjects are given three minutes to solve as many addition problems as 
they can. They receive £0.50 for each correct answer they provide. Note that in this task a 
subject’s performance does not affect the earnings of the other subject in the pair, as each 
subject is compensated based on her or his own individual performance. 
Task 2 (Tournament): Subjects are given three minutes to solve as many addition problems as 
they can. The participant who solves the largest number of correct problems in her or his pair 
receives £1 for each correctly solved problem; the other subject in the group receives no 
payment. In the case of ties between the two subjects in the pair, the winner of the 
tournament is randomly chosen. Note that in this task a subject’s performance affects the 
earnings of the other subject in the pair, as each subject is compensated in relation to the 
performance of the other member of the pair. 
Task 3: Before performing the three-minute addition task, subjects are asked to decide 
whether they want to get paid according to a piece rate (as in Task 1) or a tournament (as in 
Task 2) compensation scheme. Each subject has to make a compensation choice. When 
subjects select the piece rate, they then get paid based on their own performance in Task 3 
and receive £0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem. On the other hand, when 
subjects select the tournament, they receive £1 per correct answer if they correctly answer 
more questions than their partner did in Task 2. If they correctly answer fewer questions than 
their partner in Task 2, they receive no payment. In the case of ties, the subjects who selected 
the tournament in Task 3 will receive the tournament winnings with a 50% chance and they 
will receive no payment with a 50% chance. Note that a subject’s compensation choice 
(either piece rate or tournament) and performance during Task 3 will not affect the earnings 
of the other person in the pair. As a result, the compensation choice in Task 3 represents 
subjects’ willingness to compete. 
Task 4: Before performing the three-minute addition task, one of the subjects in the pair is 
selected at random and is given the opportunity to decide how she or he and their paired 
participant would like to be paid for their performance. When the randomly selected subject 
chooses the piece rate, each subject in the pair gets paid £0.50 for each correctly answered 
addition problem according to her or his own performance. When the randomly selected 
subject chooses the tournament, both subjects in the pair will be placed in a tournament and 
their performance in this task will be compared with the other subject’s performance in their 
pair from Task 2. Subjects who take part in the tournament are compensated at a rate of £1 
per correct answer if they obtain more correct answers that the other subject in their pair did 
in Task 2; if they do not, they receive £0. In Task 4, we use the same tie-breaking rule as in 
Task 3. Note that in this task the randomly selected participant’s compensation choice (either 
piece rate or tournament) may affect the earnings of the other person in the pair (in the case 
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that the person who does not get to select the compensation choice has different tastes over 
competition).4 
Belief-Assessment Questions: At the end of each task, subjects were asked to indicate how 
many correct additions they thought they had provided and how many correct additions they 
thought the other person in their pair had provided. Subjects received feedback about their 
own performance (and only about their own performance) at the end of each task and after 
they had indicated their beliefs about own and others’ performance. The elicitation of beliefs 
was incentivized: for each of these two correct guesses, they received an additional £1. This 
means that a subject could earn up to £2 from the belief elicitation task.  
At the end of all four tasks, one of the four tasks was selected at random, and subjects 
were paid according to their earnings in that task. Subjects were paid according to the sum of 
their earnings from the two parts of the experiment, but they knew that any information about 
earnings in Part 1 would only be given at the end of Part 2.  
Procedures: In total, 15 sessions were conducted and 240 subjects participated in our 
experiment (each session consisted of 16 subjects). 12 sessions (for a total of 192 subjects) 
were assigned to the “Identity” treatment and 3 (for a total of 48 subjects) were assigned to 
the “No-Identity” treatment. Subjects within the same “Identity” session were randomly 
allocated in the ingroup and outgroup condition: of the 192 subjects in the “Identity” 
treatment 110 were randomly allocated to the ingroup condition and 82 to the outgroup. In 
Table 1 we show a breakdown of our observations across sessions and treatments. All 
subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using the ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2015). The vast majority of participants were undergraduate students from various 
academic fields. Across all treatments, 49% of our subjects were males and 51% of our 
subjects were females. The experiment was conducted in the Birmingham Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (BEEL), and all treatments were computerized and programmed with 
the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The full set of instructions used in the experiment is 
provided in Appendix B. Some of the instructions were also presented on the computer 
screen. At the end of a session, subjects were paid in private according to their total earnings 
from both Part 1 and Part 2. Average earnings (including a show-up fee of £2.50) were as 
follows: £8.99 for the ingroup condition of the “Identity” treatment, £8.79 for the outgroup 
condition of the “Identity” treatment, and £7.82 for the “No-Identity” treatment. Sessions 
lasted, on average, for 70 minutes. 
  
4 We focus our analysis on subjects’ behavior across our treatments in Tasks 1-3 throughout the results section 
and devote less attention to Task 4 behavior because of the more limited number of observations. However, for 
completeness, we refer the readers to the Appendix where we present an analysis for Task 4 behavior. 
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Table 1. Overview of experimental design 










































Note: All sessions consist of 16 subjects. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Group identity and tournament entry 
Our main research question pertained to analyzing how group identity affects 
subjects’ willingness to compete. We therefore started our analysis by discussing whether 
and, if so, how the tournament entry in Task 3 is a function of group membership. Having 
experienced a piece rate and a tournament payment scheme (Task 1 and Task 2, respectively), 
the subjects were asked to select which of the two they wanted to apply to their Task 3 
performance.  If we look at the fraction of subjects who in Task 3 selected the tournament as 
their preferred compensation choice, we notice that while the majority of ingroups prefer the 
tournament, the majority of outgroups prefer the piece rate. Specifically, 60% of ingroups 
chose to enter the tournament, whereas the corresponding percentage for outgroups is 40%. 
We find that the observed gap between ingroups and outgroups in tournament entry is both 
substantial and statistically significant (a Fisher’s exact test yields p=0.009).5 The average 
percentage of subjects in the “No Identity” treatment who selected the tournament option is 
33.3%. 
Table 2 reports the results of two OLS regression models where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a subject selected to enter the tournament and 0 if a 
5 The average frequencies of subjects choosing the tournament are not significantly different between the 
outgroup and control conditions (Fisher’s exact test yields p=0.459). By contrast, the corresponding average 
frequencies for the comparison between the ingroup and control conditions yield statistically significant 
differences (Fisher’s exact test; p=0.003). 
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subject selected to be compensated with a piece rate payment scheme.6 In Column (1), our 
independent variables comprise two treatment dummies (referred to as the “Ingroup” and the 
“Outgroup”; therefore, subjects in the control group represent the omitted category). Column 
(2) is augmented by including a dummy variable (called “Female”) as a separate regressor, 
allowing for gender effects, which is equal to 1 if a subject is female and 0 otherwise. We 
then split the sample between men and women in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
Table 2. Piece rate and tournament entry – Regression results 




































Obs. 240 240 118 122 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) consider the 
whole sample; whereas, Columns (3) and (4) consider only the sample for men and women, separately and 
respectively. ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
The regression results from Table 2 corroborate our main observation from the 
statistical analysis. Specifically, we find that ingroups are more likely to enter the tournament 
compared to subjects in the control condition. The coefficient of the variable “Ingroup” is in 
fact statistically significant in both models. The size of the effect is 56% of the mean of the 
dependent variable and half of its standard deviation in Column (1) and 52% of the mean of 
the dependent variable and half of its standard deviation in Column (2). Yet, this is not the 
case for outgroups, who are equally likely to choose the tournament compared to subjects in 
the control condition. In Table A.1 in the Appendix we also show that ingroups are more 
likely to enter the tournament than outgroups by performing a similar analysis on a sample 
that only consists of ingroups and outgroups (using outgroups as reference category). 
As a complementary remark, we also find that females are less competitive compared 
to males as has been documented by previous relevant experimental literature (e.g., Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007).7 
Finally, we discuss how the group membership effect depends on gender. In 
particular, in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we perform separate regressions by gender. We 
find that the group membership effect seems to be present only among women.  In particular, 
6 In Appendix A, we provide additional regression analyses where we cluster standard errors at the session level 
(see Tables A.3-A.7). We obtain similar results to the ones reported in the main tables of the paper. 
7 Results are very similar if we use a Probit model instead of the linear probability model shown in Table 2. 
Similar considerations apply for all the main results reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4 where a Probit model can be 
an alternative specification. Results from Probit regressions are reported in Tables A.8-A.11 in the Appendix. 
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the coefficient of the “Ingroup” variable is positive and highly significantly different from 
zero only for the female sample, suggesting that females in ingroup matchings compete more 
than females in the control treatment. The difference between the ingroup effect on women 
and the ingroup effect on men is, however, not significantly different from zero.8 The 
coefficient of the “Outgroup” variable reported in Column (4) is also significantly different 
from zero, although only marginally (p=0.091). 
3.2 Group identity and tournament entry: the role of performance and confidence 
We then explore whether any treatment differences exist in Task 1 and Task 2 
performance using non-parametric analysis. Regarding performance in Task 1, we observe 
that subjects solve correctly 6.10 additions in the “ingroup” condition and 6.49 in the 
“outgroup” condition. This difference is not statistically significant (p=0.142). When we 
make statistical comparisons in relation to the control condition (where subjects solved, on 
average, 5.71 additions), we also find insignificant differences (p=0.481 for ingroup vs. 
control conditions; and p=0.101 for outgroup vs. control conditions). 
We next turn to Task 2 performance. Again, we find that subjects perform equally 
well in the “ingroup” as well as in the “outgroup” condition. In particular, we find that 
subjects solve correctly 8.55 additions in the “ingroup” condition and 8.27 in the “outgroup” 
condition (p=0.685). When we consider Task 2 performance in the control condition (where 
subjects solved, on average, 7.69 additions), we find only weak evidence of significant 
difference at the 10% level with respect to the “ingroup” condition (p=0.076) and statistically 
insignificant evidence at conventional levels with respect to the “outgroup” condition 
(p=0.204). 
We also perform an additional regression analysis to examine how the observed gap 
in willingness to compete between ingroups and outgroups changes if we include a 
performance measure in the regression analysis. Table 3 reports the results of two OLS 
regression models where the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a subject has 
selected to enter the tournament and 0 if a subject has selected to be compensated with a 
piece rate payment scheme. In Column (1) our independent variables comprise three dummy 
variables (“Ingroup”, “Outgroup”, and “Female,” as defined above) as well as the number of 
correct answers provided by a subject in Task 2, in Column (2) we also add the difference in 
correct responses given by a subject in Task 1 and in Task 2 among the control variables. We 
then split the sample between men and women in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
8 See Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
10 
 
                                                          
 
Table 3. Piece rate and tournament entry when controlling for performance and confidence – Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Choice of the tournament 
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Female -0.139** (0.063) 
-0.141** 
(0.063)   
-0.134** 
(0.060)   


















Obs. 240 240 118 122 239 117 122 




Our earlier findings from Table 2 are robust to the inclusion of these two additional 
variables as separate regressors. In particular, ingroups are still more likely to choose to 
compete and enter the tournament than subjects in the control condition. The coefficient of 
the variable “Ingroup" is in fact significantly different from zero in both models. The size of 
the effect is 47% of the mean of the dependent variable and half of its standard deviation. The 
observed differences in competition between ingroups and subjects in the control group 
change therefore only minimally when we also include among the control variables the two 
performance measures discussed above.9 Similar to what we find in Table 2, we also observe 
that the results seem to be driven by women (see Columns (3) and (4)).  
Next, we examine whether our results are robust when we control for confidence. We 
define “confidence” as the ratio of a subject’s beliefs about his own performance in Task 1 
divided by his beliefs about the performance of the person he is paired with in the same 
task.10 We thus ran an OLS regression where we augmented Column (2) of Table 3 by 
including “confidence” as an additional independent variable. Our regression results are 
reported in Table 3, Columns (5)-(7).11 Column (5) refers to the whole sample, while 
Columns (6) and (7) refer to men and women, respectively. 
Three are the main observations from Columns (5)-(7) of Table 3. First, the coefficient of the 
variable “confidence” is highly significant at the 1% level and is positive, implying that 
subjects with higher confidence levels are more likely to choose the tournament 
compensation scheme. This is the case for both men and women.  
Second, we find that ingroups are more willing to compete than subjects in the control 
condition (as its coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level), even when 
we control for confidence.12 The size of the ingroup treatment effect corresponds to 38% of 
the mean and of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Comparing the coefficients 
of the variable “Ingroup” in Column (2) of Table 3 (coeff. = 0.220) with the corresponding 
coefficient of “Ingroup” in Column (5) (coeff. = 0.180), we could also observe that after 
controlling for confidence, however, the size of the coefficient drops substantially 
(approximately 20%). 
Third, the ingroup treatment effect is mainly driven by women in the “Ingroup” treatment 
who appear to be more prone to compete than women in the control group, even after 
9 In Columns (3) and (4) of Table A.1 in the Appendix we also compare directly ingroups and outgroups and 
show that, even after controlling for performance in Task 2 and the difference between performance in Task 1 
and in Task 2, ingroups are more likely to enter the tournament than outgroups by performing a similar analysis 
on a sample that only consists of ingroups and outgroups.  
10 This is similar to Wozniak et al. (2014), who instead use the beliefs about the average performance in Task 1 
among the participants in the session as the denominator. 
11 Our results are not driven by outliers in the distribution of the confidence variable. Indeed the coefficients of 
the relevant variables are virtually the same if we eliminate subjects belonging to the top and bottom 5% of the 
distribution of the confidence level or if we eliminate subjects belonging to the top and bottom 10%. Results are 
available upon request. 




                                                          
controlling for confidence. Women in the “Outgroup” treatment also appear to be more prone 
to compete, but this effect is weaker. 
3.3 Heterogeneous Effects: Participation in the Team Building Task 
Finally, we present complementary evidence showing that the role played by 
individuals in their group-building task is related to the treatment effects on their competition 
decisions.13 We identify individuals who sent more messages during their group identity task 
as individuals who presumably have acquired a more active role within their group.  
As mentioned, in the “Identity” treatments (i.e., the ingroup and outgroup conditions), 
subjects were assigned to either the “Klee” group or the “Kandinsky” group (based on their 
preferences). They were then given 5 minutes to discuss four paintings of the same artists 
with members of their own group in order to make guesses about which artist made each of 
the four paintings shown. 
We first analyzed whether there were differences in the number of messages sent in 
Part 1 depending on the treatment assignment. Note that during this part, subjects did not 
know yet whether they would be assigned to the ingroup or outgroup treatment. We found 
that those subjects who belonged to the ingroup condition sent, on average, 4.78 messages; 
those subjects who belonged to the outgroup condition sent, on average, 5.14 messages.14 A 
Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no significant difference in the average number of 
messages exchanged among subjects across the two conditions (p=0.8951) as it would be 
expected given their random assignment to conditions. 
We next look separately at those subjects who sent more or fewer than the average 
number of messages across both conditions (4.98 messages). We did this by performing two 
separate regressions, as shown in Table 4. Column 1 (Column 2) reports the result of whether 
there are any significant differences between ingroups’ and outgroups' willingness to compete 
when considering subjects who sent more (or fewer) messages than the average number of 
messages.15 
  
13 Note that the goal of this section is absolutely not to discuss any possible causal impact of communication on 
competition. 
14 We further explore whether the number of messages are gender specific. In particular, we find that, in the 
“ingroup” condition, women (men) sent 4.90 (5.34) messages; whereas, in the “outgroup” condition, women 
(men) sent 4.48 (5.10) messages. When we regress the number of messages on gender (controlling for treatment 
differences), we do not find evidence of significant gender effects (coeff. = -0.532; p=0.390). 
15 Note that from this analysis, we do not include the observations from the control condition, as each subject 
performed the problem-solving task individually without having the possibility to discuss it with other subjects. 
Therefore, the omitted category is now represented by the set of subjects in the outgroup treatment. The 
coefficient of the ‘ingroup’ variable can be interpreted as the percentage difference in the willingness to 




                                                          
Table 4. Tournament entry and participation in the team building – Regression results 

















Difference in correct answers between 













Obs. 92 99 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-
percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
As shown in Table 4, for those subjects who sent more messages than the average 
(Column 1), the coefficient of the “Ingroup” variable is highly significant at the 1% level. By 
contrast, as reported in column 2, by looking at those who sent fewer messages than the 
average, we observe that the coefficient of the “Ingroup” variable becomes statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. This suggests that group membership only has an effect 
on the willingness to compete of subjects who participate the most in the group activity. In 
particular, those subjects who in Part 1 sent more messages than the average number of 
messages sent in Part 2 are more prone to compete with members of their own group than 
with members of the other group. 
3.4 Robustness 
One potential concern is that the procedure used to induce group identities may have 
primed competition among subjects in the “Identity” treatments. Following Chen and Li 
(2009), our procedure to induce group identities consisted of two components: a process that 
randomly allocated subjects to groups, and an “identity strengthening” task where subjects 
could exchange advice and opinions with other group members while solving a problem task.  
Although with our data we cannot disentangle a potential priming effect of the task 
from its group identity effect, we think that the following considerations provide some 
reassurance in this regard. Chen and Li (2009) did run a treatment where group identities 
were induced only via random group assignment and without having subjects participate in 
the “identity-strengthening” task. They find that the “identity-strengthening” treatment 
significantly increases self-reported group attachment, but has only small effects on behavior. 




The fact that such task gave subjects the opportunity to communicate, however, may 
have had an impact on competitiveness not just through the induced group identity but also 
through the information revealed in the communication stage. Therefore we may still be 
worried that the positive (and significantly different from zero) coefficient of the variable 
“Ingroup” could be explained by the within group communication during the team building 
task: during the communication time subjects within the same group may learn about 
characteristics of the members of their own group and in particular, what matters for our 
purposes, they may have a better understanding of their possible performance in the addition 
task. In order to disregard such alternative mechanism (unrelated to group identity) in Table 5 
we sequentially add as control variables in the main specification the beliefs of each subject 
about his own performance in Tasks 1 and 2 and the beliefs about the performance of his 
competitor in Tasks 1 and 2 in a non-linear fashion.16 Across all models reported, we find 
that the coefficient of the variable “Ingroup” remains similar. 
To further rule out an information mechanism, we present evidence that the 
information acquired during the “identity strengthening” task in Part 1 of the experiment is 
unrelated to subjects’ performance in the addition task. We therefore look at correlations at 
the individual level between the number of correct answers in the “identity strengthening” 
task in Part 1 of the experiment and subjects’ performance in the addition task in each of the 
three Tasks. When we perform Pearson’s correlation tests for the whole sample we find that 
the level of the correlation is always fairly low and never significantly different from zero. 
Correlation coefficients (and p-values within parenthesis) are respectively 0.061 (p=0.399), -
0.010 (p=0.889) and 0.033 (p=0.654) if we consider the addition task in Task 1, the addition 
task in Task 2 and the addition task in Task 3, respectively).17 Similar results are obtained if 
we also perform separate Pearson’s correlation tests for the samples of ingroup (correlation 
coefficients (p-values) are -0.018 (p=0.855), -0.017 (p=0.862) and -0.035 (p=0.716) in Task 
1, Task 2 and Task 3, respectively) and outgroup (correlation coefficients (p-values) are 
0.148 (p=0.184), 0.015 (p=0.895) and 0.127 (p=0.257) in Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3, 
respectively) matches.  
Additionally, we show that the information collected by subjects during the “identity 
strengthening” task is unlikely to have changed subjects’ beliefs about others’ performance in 
the addition task. We start by calculating for each subject the average performance of his/her 
group members during the “identity strengthening” task. Then we consider only the sample of 
“Ingroup” matchings, that is the sample of individuals who during Part 1 of the experiment 
could have potentially collected useful information about their competitors and therefore 
could have updated their beliefs about their competitor’s performance in Part 2. We provide 
evidence that for each of the three relevant Tasks in Part 2 of the experiment the beliefs about 
others’ performance in the addition task are unrelated to the average performance of the 
subject’s peers in the “identity strengthening” task: the size of the correlation coefficient from 
the Pearson’s correlation test (and p-values within parenthesis) are -0.013 (p=0.896), 0.001 
16 If we include only a linear specification, we obtain similar results (available upon request). 
17 We also perform the same test at the session level and obtain very similar results. 
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(p=0.989) and -0.012 (p=0.905) if we consider the addition task in Task 1, in Task 2 and in 
Task 3 respectively.18 
Table 5. Robustness checks 
 Dependent variable: Choice of tournament 

























Number of correct 










Difference in correct 
responses between Task 









Task 1: Beliefs (own), 
and Beliefs (own) ^2 
yes yes yes yes 
Task 1: Beliefs (other), 
and Beliefs (other) ^2 
no yes yes yes 
Task 2: Beliefs (own), 
and Beliefs (own) ^2 
no no yes yes 
Task 2: Beliefs (other), 
and Beliefs (other) ^2 









Obs. 240 240 240 240 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-
percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Understanding the behavioral determinants and impact of social relationships on 
individuals’ behavior has captured a lot of interest in the experimental economics literature. 
In this paper, we conduct an experimental study that analyzes the effects of social distance on 
a major aspect of individuals’ decision making: whether or not to compete. By using 
established techniques from social psychology, we manipulate the degree of social distance 
among group members. We then examine whether and, if so, how this affects their 
willingness to compete by asking them to select between a non-competitive (i.e. piece rate) 
and a competitive (i.e. tournament) incentive scheme. The findings from our study provide 
robust evidence that social distance is indeed a significant factor affecting competition 
choices. More specifically, a lower social distance among individuals results in a higher 
willingness to compete with each other. 
18 Correlations are computed at the individual level. We also perform the same test at the session level and 
obtain very similar results. 
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 We also find that a stronger taste for competition against ingroups is observed mostly 
among those individuals who are willing to send more messages in the team-based activities. 
We interpret these findings as evidence in favor of the hypothesis that individuals who 
actively participate in group activities are also more concerned about social comparisons 
within their group and thus are more likely to choose a competitive compensation scheme. 
Future research should analyze in more detail the complex relationship between social status 
within a group and competitive preferences. 
 Our findings also nicely complement existing experimental studies which show that 
group identity and pro-sociality are positively related. Individuals with strong group identities 
typically exhibit more altruistic (see Bernhard et al., 2006) and cooperative behavior (see 
Eckel and Grossman, 2005) within their own group. We focus on a different aspect of 
economic behavior: namely, competitiveness. Existing psychological analysis categorizes 
competition as being at the opposite end of the social value orientations’ spectrum (see 
Murphy, 2011) compared to cooperative motivations. Our experiment provides new evidence 
showing that group identity generates a surprising effect as far as competition is concerned: 
individuals make more competitive choices in within group matchings. 
 In addition, our study gives rise to certain future research avenues. Other factors may 
play a decisive role in defining the level of competition, which may interact with the level of 
identification among individuals in a society. For instance, it is likely that the size of the 
group plays an important role in defining the preferences for competition. The larger the 
group, the more diluted the comparison effect may be but the larger the pool of individuals on 
which to establish the primate by choosing to compete. How social distance among group 
members interacts with the group size and competition choices is an open empirical question 
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 Online Supplementary Material 
Appendix A. Additional analyses 
 
Table A.1. Piece rate and tournament entry –  
Additional regression results (outgroup omitted category) 
 Dependent variable: Choice of the tournament 



















Number of correct 
answers provided in 
Task 2 






Difference in correct 
answers between 
Task 2 and Task 1 
















Obs. 192 192 192 192 191 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
Table A.2. Piece rate and tournament entry – Regression results (with interaction terms) 







Female × Ingroup 0.218 
(0.164) 





Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5-




Table A.3. Piece rate and tournament entry – Regression results (clustered standard errors) 
















Obs. 240 240 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are presented in parentheses. ** 
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
Table A.4. Piece rate and tournament entry when controlling for performance – Regression 
results (clustered standard errors) 




















Difference in correct responses between 







Obs. 240 240 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are presented in parentheses. ** 





Table A.5. Confidence and group identity – Regression results (clustered standard errors) 
 Dependent variable: 
Confidence = Beliefs about own performance in Task 1 / Beliefs 










Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are presented in parentheses. * 
denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-
percent level. 
 
Table A.6. The role of confidence in tournament entry – Regression results (clustered 
standard errors) 











Difference in correct responses between 








Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are presented in parentheses. ** 





Table A.7. Tournament entry and participation in the team building – Regression results 
(clustered standard errors) 

















Difference in correct answers between 













Obs. 92 99 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are presented in parentheses. * 
denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-
percent level. 
 
Table A.8. Piece rate and tournament entry – Probit regression results 










Female  -0.172*** 
(0.059) 
Obs. 240 240 
Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5-





Table A.9. Piece rate and tournament entry when controlling for performance – Probit 
regression results 















Number of correct answers 





Difference in correct responses 
between Task 2 and Task 1 
 0.014 
(0.015) 
Obs. 240 240 
Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
Table A.10. The role of confidence in tournament entry – Probit regression results 








Number of correct answers provided 
in Task 2 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Difference in correct responses 






Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5-






Table A.11. Tournament entry and participation in the team building – Probit regression 
results 

















Difference in correct answers between 









Obs. 92 99 
Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-
percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
 
Analysis of ingroup vs. outgroup differences in Task 4 
While our main research questions are concerned with the role of group identity in 
affecting competition choices, for reasons of completeness, we present an analysis of 
subjects’ behavior in Task 4. As explained in Section 2, in Task 4, one subject in each pair 
was selected at random and was given the opportunity to decide how he or she and the paired 
participant would like to be paid for their performance. Within the subsample of the 
randomly selected subjects, we observe substantially weaker willingness to compete in Task 
4 (on average, 23% of them selected the tournament option) than in Task 3 (49% of subjects 
chose to compete): subjects tend to be less competitive when they know their decision is 
going to affect the payoffs of the subjects to whom they have been paired. However, we do 
not find any evidence that the group matching effects documented in the previous section 
varies between Task 3 and Task 4. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.12, we look more 
closely at whether the determinants of the likelihood of entering the tournament of randomly 
selected subjects are different across treatments in Task 3 and Task 4 of the experiment. Our 
findings provide no evidence that the coefficients of the variables “Ingroups” and 




Table A.12. Likelihood of entering tournament – Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Choice of the 
tournament in… 
 Task 3 Task 4 













Difference in correct answers between Task 1 













Obs. 120 120 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-





Appendix B. Experimental instructions 
[Note: These are the written instructions as presented to subjects facing the “Identity” treatments. Amendments 




Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the 
“Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by various research 
institutions. Just for showing up you have already earned £2.50. You can earn additional money 
depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is therefore very important that you 
read these instructions with care. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We 
expect and appreciate your following of these rules. 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in 
this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until you are 
instructed to do so. If you have any questions at any point, please raise your hand and one of us will 
come to your desk to answer your question. Please do not ask any question out loud. Thank you. 
This experiment consists of two different parts, PART 1 and PART 2. In each part you will be asked 
to make one or more decisions and will have a chance to earn money. The amount of money you will 
earn in each part of the experiment will depend on your decisions and may depend on other 
participants’ decisions. The total amount you will earn from the experiment will be the sum of the 
earnings you make in the two parts of the experiment. Your cash earnings will be paid to you in 
private at the end of the experiment. 
You will be informed about your earnings from the two parts of the experiment only at the end of the 
session. Therefore, in PART 2, everyone will make their decisions without knowing any outcome 
from PART 1. The instructions for PART 1 of the experiment are displayed directly on screen. All 
participants in this session have identical instructions. Once everyone in the room has completed 








 At the beginning of PART 2 the computer will pair you with one other participant in this room. Your 
pair will belong either to your own group or to the other group from PART 1. Each participant will 
privately be informed of the group membership of the participant s/he is paired with. You will remain 
paired with the same person until the end of the experiment. You will not learn the identity of the 
other participant you are paired with during or after today’s session. 
[NO IDENTITY: At the beginning of PART 2 the computer will pair you with one other participant in 
this room. You will remain paired with the same person until the end of the experiment. You will 
not learn the identity of the other participant you are paired with during or after today’s session.] 
 
The Task 
In this experiment you will be performing a task four different times. The task will consist of having 
you solve 2-digit 4-number addition problems in a 3 minute period. 
The addition problems will look similar to the following equation: 
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 = 
In some cases, you will be asked to make decisions about how you will potentially be paid for your 
performance. 
Only one of the four tasks will determine your payout for the experiment and it will be randomly 
chosen at the end. 
To answer a problem, you will simply type the numbers on the keyboard, then click the “Submit” 
button and another problem will appear. You can choose not to answer a question by clicking the 
“Submit” button. The answer will then be recorded as being incorrect and you will be moved to the 
next problem. 
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 3 minute 
duration. 






For Task 1, you will be paid £0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem during the 3 minute 
time limit. The person you are paired with will be paid £0.50 for each correctly answered addition 
problem as well. 
Notice that your performance during Task 1 will not affect the earnings of the other person in your 
pair and the performance of the other person in your pair during Task 1 will not affect your earnings. 
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly when the 3 minute period has 
elapsed. At the end of the 3 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance and the 
other person’s performance in your pair. You will receive extra money for correct estimates. If you 
estimate your exact performance correctly, you will receive £1. If you estimate the other person in 
your pair’s exact performance correctly, you will receive an additional £1. 
After you enter your decisions, please click the “Submit” button. You will then be taken to a screen 
showing how many problems you answered correctly. 
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at any time. The task will begin once everyone in 
this session is ready to begin. Once everyone has completed Task 1, you will receive new instructions 






For Task 2, you will be placed in a tournament and compete in the number task against the other 
person in your pair. The tournament will always have a size of 2, including yourself. 
If you win the tournament you will be paid £1 for each correctly answered problem and the person 
you are paired with will receive £0. If you do not win the tournament then you will receive £0 and the 
person you are paired with will be paid £1 for each correctly answered problem they provided. 
In the event of a tie for first place, the winner of the tournament will be determined randomly. That is, 
with a 50% chance you will receive the tournament winnings and with a 50% chance the person you 
are paired with will receive the tournament winnings. 
Notice that your performance during Task 2 will affect the earnings of the other person in your pair 
and the performance of the other person in your pair during Task 2 will affect your earnings. 
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly when the 3 minute period has 
elapsed. At the end of the 3 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance and the 
other person’s performance in your pair. You will receive extra money for correct estimates. If you 
estimate your exact performance correctly, you will receive £1. If you estimate the other person in 
your pair’s exact performance correctly, you will receive an additional £1. 
After you enter your decisions, please click the “Submit” button. You will then be taken to a screen 
showing how many problems you answered correctly. 
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at any time. The task will begin once everyone in 
this session is ready to begin. Once everyone has completed Task 2, you will receive new instructions 





For this Task, you will be given the opportunity to decide how you would like to be paid for your 
performance. You can either choose the individual piece rate pay or enter in a tournament. You will 
remain paired with the same person as in Task 2. 
If you choose the piece rate pay, you will be paid £0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem 
during the 3 minute time limit. If you select tournament, you will compete against the Task 2 
performance of the other person in your pair. You will be paid at a rate of £1 per correct answer, if 
you obtain more correct answers than the other person in your pair did in Task 2. If not, you will 
receive £0. In the event of a tie for first place, with a 50% chance you will receive the tournament 
winnings and with a 50% chance you will receive £0. 
The other person in your pair will be given the opportunity to decide how they would like to be paid 
for their performance as well. If they choose the piece rate pay, they will be paid £0.50 for each 
correctly answered addition problem during the 3 minute time limit. If they select tournament, they 
will compete against your performance in Task 2. They will be paid at a rate of £1 per correct answer, 
if they obtain more correct answers than you did in Task 2. If not, they will receive £0. In the event of 
a tie for first place, with a 50% chance the other person in your pair will receive the tournament 
winnings and with a 50% chance they will receive £0. 
Notice that your compensation choice (either piece rate or tournament) and your performance during 
Task 3 will not affect the earnings of the other person in your pair. The compensation choice (either 
piece rate or tournament) of the other person in your pair and their performance during Task 3 will not 
affect your earnings. 
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly when the 3 minute period has 
elapsed. At the end of the 3 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance and the 
other person’s performance in your pair. You will receive extra money for correct estimates. If you 
estimate your exact performance correctly, you will receive £1. If you estimate the other person in 
your pair’s exact performance correctly, you will receive an additional £1. 
After you enter your decisions, please click the “Submit” button. You will then be taken to a screen 
showing how many problems you answered correctly. 
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at any time. The task will begin once everyone in 
this session is ready to begin. Once everyone has completed Task 3, you will receive new instructions 





For this Task, one participant from each pair will be selected at random and will be given the 
opportunity to decide how they and their paired participant would like to be paid for their 
performance. The randomly selected participant can either choose the individual piece rate pay or 
enter in a tournament. You will remain paired with the same person as in Task 2. 
If the randomly selected participant chooses the piece rate pay, each participant in a pair will be paid 
£0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem during the 3 minute time limit. 
If the randomly selected participant chooses to enter a tournament, both participants will be placed in 
a tournament. Your performance in this task will be compared with the other person’s performance in 
your pair from Task 2. The other person’s performance in this task will be compared with your 
performance from Task 2.  
You will be paid at a rate of £1 per correct answer, if you obtain more correct answers that the other 
person in your pair did in Task 2. If not, you will receive £0. In the event of a tie for first place, with a 
50% chance you will receive the tournament winnings and with a 50% chance you will receive £0. 
The other person in your pair will be paid at a rate of £1 per correct answer, if they obtain more 
correct answers than you did in Task 2. If not, they will receive £0. In the event of a tie for first place, 
with a 50% chance the other person in your pair will receive the tournament winnings and with a 50% 
chance they will receive £0. 
Notice that your performance during Task 4 will not affect the earnings of the other person in your 
pair and the performance of the other person in your pair during Task 4 will not affect your earnings. 
The randomly selected participant’s compensation choice (either piece rate or tournament) may affect 
the earnings of the other person in your pair.  
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly when the 3 minute period has 
elapsed. At the end of the 3 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance and the 
other person’s performance in your pair. You will receive extra money for correct estimates. If you 
estimate your exact performance correctly, you will receive £1. If you estimate the other person in 
your pair’s exact performance correctly, you will receive an additional £1. 
After you enter your decisions, please click the “Submit” button. You will then be taken to a screen 
showing how many problems you answered correctly. 
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at any time. The task will begin once everyone in 
this session is ready to begin. Once everyone has completed Task 4, the experiment will be over. Do 
you have any questions at this point? 
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